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DISTORTION OTHER THAN PRICE DISTORTION 
URSKA VELIKONJA

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fraud-on-the-market doctrine adopted in Basic Inc. v. Levinson 
(“Basic”) allows the plaintiff suing under Rule 10b-5 to satisfy the reliance 
requirement by showing that the market in which the security was traded 
was efficient and that she purchased the security at the market price during 
the period of the misrepresentation.
1
 If she succeeds, the plaintiff is 
entitled to two presumptions: first, that the misrepresentation distorted the 
price of that security, and second, that she purchased the security in 
reliance on that misrepresentation.
2
 
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”),3 the 
Court considered a direct attack on Basic’s presumptions, and declined to 
do away with them. Judging by the volume of academic commentary to 
date, the most significant contribution of Halliburton II is a more 
pragmatic definition of market efficiency, which is the underlying 
mechanism that converts information about securities into their prices.
4
 To 
invoke the presumption of reliance in a fraud-on-the-market suit, plaintiffs 
no longer need to show that the market for a public company security is 
hyper-efficient, in that it fully and quickly impounds into stock prices all 
publicly available information, as some courts have required.
5
 Rather, the 
Court embraced the notion that market efficiency is a “matter of degree.”6 
In a subsidiary challenge to the Basic presumptions individually, the 
Court declined to reject the first of the two presumptions—that a public 
misrepresentation distorts the price of a security traded in a reasonably 
efficient market—and to require plaintiffs to show, at the class 
certification stage, that the defendant’s misrepresentation in fact distorted 
 
 
  Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Associate Professor of 
Law, Emory University School of Law. For invaluable comments, I thank Edward Labaton, Don 
Langevoort, Ann Lipton, and participants at the ILEP 21st Annual Symposium on New Directions for 
Corporate and Securities Litigation. 
 1. 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988). 
 2. Id. at 247. 
 3. 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014). 
 4. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on 
Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37, 51 (2015); Ann M. Lipton, 
Searching for Market Efficiency, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (2015). 
 5. See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2005) (refusing to 
find the market efficient unless it rapidly reflects all information relevant to firm value).  
 6. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410. 
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the price of a particular security.
7
 The Court did throw defendants a bone 
and allowed them to prevent the class from being certified if defendants 
could show that the alleged misrepresentation did not impact the price of 
the publicly-traded security.
8
 How exactly defendants are supposed to do 
that has been left for the lower courts to figure out.
9
 
In a majority of cases—the “confirmatory lie” cases where the 
defendant conceals the truth and thus prevents an immediate price 
reaction
10—it is the absence of price movement at the time of the 
misrepresentation that is allegedly fraudulent. In such cases, neither 
plaintiffs nor defendants can demonstrate empirically what impact the 
misrepresentation had on the price of the security at the time it was 
uttered. Instead, various courts have used the price reaction at the moment 
of corrective disclosure as a proxy,
11
 but it is an imperfect proxy for the 
extent to which the original misrepresentation distorted the price at the 
time that it was made.
12
 The Court followed lower courts’ approach by 
allowing defendants to show the lack of price distortion at the time of the 
misrepresentation by offering evidence that the corrective disclosure has 
no impact on the stock price, without acknowledging the limitations of the 
proxy.
13
 
In this Article, I propose that much of Halliburton II’s second 
holding—that a defendant can prevent class certification by showing no 
statistically significant movement in the price of the security at the time of 
corrective disclosure—does nothing to improve the quality of securities 
class-action litigation, and could make it worse.
14
 
 
 
 7. Id. at 2413. The basic impetus behind efforts to bring proof of price distortion forward to the 
class-certification stage is that the judge can “determine the price distortion question based on the 
preponderance standard applicable to certification,” and not on a more plaintiff-friendly summary 
judgment standard. Mark Moller, Common Problems for the Common Answers Test: Class 
Certification in Amgen and Comcast, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 301, 317–18.  
 8. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415–17. 
 9. See Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: Who Won and Who Lost All Depends on What Defendants 
Need to Show to Establish No Impact on Price, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 30, 2014), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/06/30/halliburton-ii-who-won-and-who-lost-all-depends-on-
what-defendants-need-to-show-to-establish-no-impact-on-price/. 
 10. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. LAW. 671, 692 (2014). 
 11. See e.g., Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1062–65 (9th Cir. 
2008); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 44–45. 
 12. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 895, 929–30 (2013). 
 13. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 47.  
 14. How much worse will depend on how eagerly lower courts embrace Halliburton II 
authorization to deny class certification and how low a bar they set for defendants to rebut the 
presumption of price impact.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/11
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In an earlier article, I explained in considerable detail that disclosure 
fraud is economically harmful not because it hurts buyers and sellers of 
public company stock—though it certainly hurts some—but because it 
produces considerable economic consequences that are not fully captured 
by stock price movements.
15
 Halliburton II, and the cases before it, focus 
exclusively on securities price distortion and price impact, consistent with 
the idea that Rule 10b-5 litigation is a cause of action available to 
purchasers and sellers of securities.
16
 While the idea seems sound legally, 
it is less sound economically. Inaccurate stock prices and subsequent 
corrections do not harm shareholders as a class; they merely redistribute 
wealth between selling and buying shareholders.
17
 This process, by itself, 
produces some welfare losses, including enhanced monitoring by 
investors, greater price volatility, and reduced liquidity as weary investors 
stay away from the market. As a result, issuers must pay a premium to 
account for the higher risk and cost, and thus cannot fund investments on 
the margin.
18
 
But a significant portion of welfare losses caused by financial 
manipulation is the product of the distortion in capital allocation, and 
resulting changes in investment, employment, and output, all of which are 
used to detect, avoid, exploit, or cover up the misrepresentation.
19
 Fraud 
firms’ disclosures are used by other firms in their own investment 
decisions, spreading welfare losses beyond the fraud firm like fruit rot.
20
 
These economic consequences are associated with securities frauds that 
are discovered as well as with those that are not.
21
 If the truth ultimately 
catches up with the fraud firm, the firm can sometimes pass the cost on to 
non-shareholders.
22
 
 
 
 15. See generally Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887 
(2013).  
 16. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747 (1975) (explaining that 
securities litigation is available only to purchasers and sellers of securities). 
 17. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1901–02 n.56. 
 18. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 
DUKE L.J. 977, 1043 (1992) (observing that inaccurate stock prices impair, among other things, the 
allocation of capital, reduce liquidity, and produce stock-price oriented management); Paul G. 
Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 631 
(1992) (noting that if the legal system did not deter fraud, investors would take greater precautions 
against it). 
 19. See discussion infra Part III. 
 20. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1933–37 (summarizing empirical studies showing changes 
in the cost of capital, in investment, and in hiring decisions by rival firms because of accounting 
fraud). 
 21. In fact, mere errors, too, can cause economic distortion, particularly those that are larger and 
more persistent. See id. at 1927. 
 22. Peress has shown that firms that operate in concentrated markets can increase product prices 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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All of this is a long way of saying that financial misreporting by public 
companies distorts more than just the price of the firms’ securities, and 
that distortion other than that affecting the prices of public securities can 
in some circumstances be more significant and economically wasteful than 
stock price distortion. This Article develops an analytical matrix that 
identifies possible combinations of distortions in the stock price and 
economic dislocation to suggest when fraud-on-the-market litigation is 
likely to insufficiently deter disclosure fraud.
23
 Based on empirical studies, 
this Article identifies the circumstances in which large economic 
distortions caused by false disclosures are likely to be particularly large. In 
light of these observations, the Article suggests that fraud-on-the-market 
litigation should not be understood primarily as a remedy for victimized 
shareholders, who can often eliminate the cost of fraud ex ante, but as a 
quasi qui tam cause of action available to purchasers and sellers of 
(usually equity) securities to police economically-harmful false disclosures 
by public companies.
24
 Even in cases where buyers and sellers of stock are 
not the class most significantly harmed by disclosure fraud, they nearly 
always suffer some identifiable losses, thus avoiding difficult evidentiary 
questions about standing. When viewed through this lens, many of the 
objections to securities litigation become moot and its virtues are revealed. 
In that this Article is sympathetic and consistent with ideas of “publicness” 
discussed in the article by Professors Sale and Thompson that is part of 
this symposium.
25
 
II. WHAT PURPOSE DOES SECURITIES LITIGATION SERVE? 
In recent decades, countless articles have denounced securities 
litigation, many suggesting that it is a nothing more than a costly pocket-
shifting transfer of wealth without many corresponding benefits.
26
 The 
 
 
in the aftermath of business shocks to preserve profits and reduce the impact on the stock price. Joel 
Peress, Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market Efficiency, 65 J. FIN. 1, 4–5 
(2010); see also Annie Gasparro, Starbucks to Raise Prices, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2012),  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203550304577138922045363052 (reporting that the 
firm’s customers were less sensitive to price increases than its rivals and so the firm decided to raise 
prices of brewed coffee to offset higher costs caused by futures contracts for coffee—in other words, 
to shield investors from the misjudgment of the company’s management by passing along the cost to 
its customers). 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. See infra Part IV.  
 25. Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities 
Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 26. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 694–95 (arguing that vicarious liability for 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/11
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critiques usually observe that attorneys file securities class actions on 
behalf of shareholder plaintiffs—usually purchasers of overpriced stock—
seeking compensation for losses caused by fraudulent misrepresentations 
from the issuer and its top management.
27
 In a large majority of cases, the 
issuer did not trade in the affected security during the period of 
misrepresentation, and thus did not benefit from its fraudulently distorted 
price.
28
 The lucky sellers of overpriced securities are the ones who benefit, 
and they are allowed to keep their gain. Instead, the issuer, who rarely 
trades in its own securities, and its top management are listed as 
defendants. In all but a handful of cases, only the issuer, directly or 
indirectly though its D&O insurer, pays damages to settle a securities class 
action.
29
 The money comes from the issuer’s current shareholders, who are 
ostensibly the victims of the fraud. Damages in securities class actions, 
thus, add insult to injury and victimize the shareholders for the second 
time—this has been described as circularity at the firm level.30 
In addition, critiques of securities litigation note that damages in 
securities class actions also suffer from circularity at the investor level.
31
 
Investors can eliminate firm-specific risk of fraud by self-insuring through 
diversification and trading. Diversification cannot eliminate systematic 
risk of fraud, but all securities are sold at a discount that reflects the 
 
 
securities fraud transfers wealth from one group of innocent investors to another similar group without 
performing any useful social function); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An 
Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534–38 (2006) (arguing that 
securities fraud class actions neither compensate victims nor deter wrongdoing); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 639–41 
(1996) (proposing capped damages for securities fraud because damages equal to out-of-pocket losses 
are grossly disproportionate to harm suffered); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to 
Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 927–30 
(1999) (proposing to replace costly and ineffective securities fraud class actions with monitoring by 
stock exchanges). 
 27. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 26, at 1534 (asserting that securities litigation is “mainly pocket-
shifting wealth transfers among shareholders”); Pritchard, supra note 26, at 927–28. 
 28. Pritchard, supra note 26, at 928. In the largest class action settlements, however, the issuer 
often did sell securities and benefit from financial misrepresentation. See James J. Park, Bondholders 
and Securities Class Actions, 99 MINN. L. REV. 585, 609–12 (2014) (showing that holders of bonds 
issued during misrepresentation recovered in nineteen of the largest thirty securities class action 
settlements between 1996 and 2005). Even when the issuer does not sell securities, the issuer tends to 
benefit in other ways from fraud. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1910–11. 
 29. See, e.g., Michael Klausner et al., How Protective Is D&O Insurance in Securities Class 
Actions? An Update, 26 PLUS J. REPRINT 1, 1, 3–4 (2013) (reporting that while CEOs and CFOs were 
named as defendants in 93% and 80%, respectively, of securities class actions filed between 2006 and 
2010, officers paid out of pocket in only 2% of those cases).  
 30. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 26, at 1556–57. 
 31. See, e.g., James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 547, 580 n.91 (2013).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
430 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:425 
 
 
 
 
market risk of fraud. At least ex ante, securities purchasers should be 
indifferent to disclosure fraud if its prevalence and impact on the prices of 
securities remain stable over time.
32
 Fraud consistently harms only those 
shareholders who cannot diversify and trade.
33
 
Since compensation can provide only a limited rationale for securities 
class action litigation, most commentators today agree that perhaps such 
litigation could be justified as a deterrent of fraudulent misrepresentations 
by public companies.
34
 Class actions supplement public enforcement 
efforts and can “vindicate the public interest through private litigation.”35 
But, as critics have often argued, class actions fall short on the 
deterrence front for two reasons. First, individual managers who are 
responsible for securities fraud rarely pay out of pocket to settle securities 
class action claims.
36
 Nevertheless, because managers apparently dislike 
the hassle of litigation, there is evidence that public firms that operate in 
capital markets where the threat of fraud-on-the-market litigation is real 
are less likely to commit disclosure fraud than those that are immune from 
such threat.
37
 
Second, and a bigger problem with the deterrence justification for 
securities litigation—one that this Article takes on—is that the potential 
liability exposure in a fraud-on-the-market suit has little to do with the 
social harm engendered by fraudulent disclosure. Defendants’ exposure in 
a fraud-on-the-market suit is the difference between the price that the 
plaintiffs paid to purchase the security (or sale price in those cases where 
price inflation is fraudulently suppressed) and the value of that security 
 
 
 32. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1893.  
 33. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 55 (explaining that “injuries are real when investors trade at 
distorted prices, and the injuries simply cannot be assumed away by hoping that the victims will make 
up their losses elsewhere”). 
 34. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not 
Trade, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 297, 304, 321; Sale & Thompson, supra note 25. 
 35. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 175 (1997); see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political 
Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 150 (2011) (quoting a speech by former SEC 
Chairman Harold Williams explaining that private litigation is a necessary supplement to SEC 
enforcement). 
 36. See, e.g., Klausner et al., supra note 29, at 3–4. 
 37. See, e.g., Simi Kedia et al., Evidence on Contagion in Earnings Management, 90 ACCT. REV. 
2337, 2363–65 & tbl.7 (2015) (reporting that securities litigation after a restatement deters earnings 
manipulation by peer firms); James P. Naughton et al., Private Litigation Costs and Voluntary 
Disclosure: Evidence from the Morrison Ruling 28 (Oct. 7, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432371 (providing evidence that liability risk increases voluntary 
disclosure by firms). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/11
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absent fraudulent disclosure.
38
 But as noted above, for every losing seller 
of a publicly-traded security, there is a winning buyer; fraudulent 
disclosure merely redistributes wealth between owners of securities.
39
 
Wealth transfers are not social costs.  
The aggregate amount of trading losses caused by fraudulent disclosure 
may, by chance, overlap with the social cost, just like a broken clock is 
right twice a day. Most commentators seem to agree that defendants’ 
liability exposure in a fraud-on-the-market suit will generally be too large 
because gains by securities sellers offset losses by purchasers (assuming 
no insider trading).
40
 In response, commentators have proposed capping 
damages or otherwise limiting issuer liability for securities fraud.
41
 But 
once the overall social costs of disclosure fraud are taken into account, the 
issuer’s exposure in a fraud-on-the-market suit could be too small for 
reasons described in more detail in Part III. By ignoring non-shareholder 
losses in securities class actions, judicial and academic commentary to 
date has largely ignored the potential for securities litigation to under-
deter both managers and issuers. 
III. DISCLOSURE AND DISTORTION 
In order to prevail in a fraud-on-the-market securities class action, 
plaintiffs must show that they purchased securities at a price materially 
distorted by fraud and that they were harmed by false disclosure when 
truthful information was finally revealed.
42
 Halliburton II and its 
 
 
 38. With additional modifications under the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 
U.S.C.) (“PSLRA”). The most relevant modifications include proportional liability and a safe harbor 
for forward-looking statements. 
 39. See Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 159, 169 (1986) (concluding that “the net measurable damages from a stock fraud will be 
zero” in most cases); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class 
Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1502 (1996) (arguing that diversification and frequent trading 
effectively protect investors against securities fraud). 
 40. See e.g., Langevoort, supra note 26, at 639 (“Practitioners and academics have known for 
some time that the standard measure of liability in open-market securities fraud cases can be excessive. 
The effort to award all affected marketplace traders their ‘out-of-pocket’ damages creates the potential 
for recovery grossly disproportionate to the nature of the underlying violation.”); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 155 (raising 
concern about “the possibility that issuer damage liability may be disproportionate to the underlying 
conduct”); Posner, supra note 39, at 169. 
 41. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 651–52 (1985); Langevoort, supra note 26, at 639. 
 42. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336, 341–42 (2005). 
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predecessors predicate the class action on price impact and distortion 
caused by the fraudulent misrepresentation.
43
 This is entirely consistent 
with the fraud-on-the-market class action’s pedigree as a remedy for 
purchasers and sellers of securities. As explained earlier, the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine creates a presumption that material misrepresentations 
affecting a public security distort its price. To recover, purchasers and 
sellers of affected securities do not need to show that they were aware of 
any particular fraudulent communication: it is presumed that false 
information will distort the price of the security, so long as that security 
trades in a reasonably efficient market.
44
 The presumption makes sense 
because in such a market, rational investors do not rely on any particular 
piece of information when buying securities. Rather, rational investors rely 
on the prices themselves, based on a broader notion that securities prices 
reasonably reflect all publicly available information.
45
 Prices distorted by 
fraud will hurt such investors, even if the investors never read the false 
disclosure. 
But stock price distortion is a symptom of the underlying disease: the 
distortion of (usually) financial information about the firm and its 
operations. To be sure, the consequence of false disclosure is the distortion 
in the price of its securities, in particular the issuer’s common stock, but 
that is an indirect effect. False information about the issuer can distort the 
behavior of market participants directly.
46
 
 
 
 43. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405–07 
(2014); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013). 
 44. In other words, much trading in securities markets occurs without reference to specific 
company disclosures. See Fisch, supra note 12, at 929–30. 
 45. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market 
does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is 
reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, 
may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b–5 action.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Art Durnev & Claudine Mangen, Corporate Investments: Learning from 
Restatements, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 679, 699–701 (2009) (reporting that firms overinvest during fraud 
committed by their rivals in reliance on their false financial statements); Cristi A. Gleason et al., The 
Contagion Effects of Accounting Restatements, 83 ACCT. REV. 83, 94 (2008) (providing evidence that 
misrepresentations produce overinvestment by both the restating firm and the industry during fraud); 
Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Markets: Theory and a Case 
from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439 (2006) (using 
WorldCom to demonstrate the real economic consequences of accounting fraud).  
 There is also a growing body of literature documenting spillover effects between capital market 
regulation product markets. See, e.g., Igor Goncharov & Caspar David Peter, Does Reporting 
Transparency Affect Industry Coordination? Evidence from the Duration of International Cartels 32 
(LUMS Dep’t of Accounting & Fin. Working Paper Series, No. AF2014/15WP04, 2016), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2530385 (showing that “improvements in reporting transparency and 
enforcement can complement competition policy” and reduce the prevalence and duration of cartels).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/11
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Financial disclosure by public firms is useful for and used by all sorts 
of market participants: creditors use it to price credit,
47
 parties in longer-
term, open-ended contractual relationships with the firm (e.g., employees, 
vendors) use it to renegotiate such agreements and to adjust their extra-
contractual expectations,
48
 and rivals use such information to direct their 
own investment decisions.
49
 Where disclosed information on which third 
parties rely is false, it can distort real economic behavior and thereby 
misallocate scarce capital and labor. Lower-return projects are funded 
while higher return ones are not, producing deadweight losses. In addition, 
false information impairs economic learning and exacerbates boom-and-
bust cycles.
50
 Through these processes, false disclosure can produce 
considerable negative externalities that can be directly attributed to 
disclosure fraud, but are neither considered nor relevant in a fraud-on-the-
market suit.
51
 
If real economic distortion is small relative to the stock price distortion, 
then perhaps the fraud-on-the-market class action could be defended as a 
“good enough” deterrent, at least in principle. Similarly, if stock price 
distortion and economic distortion are perfectly correlated—a large 
financial misrepresentation leads to both a large stock price and real 
economic distortion—the fraud-on-the-market class action will at least 
target the right sorts of frauds, even if it ultimately under-deters.
52
 
However, if not, the fraud-on-the-market suit as understood today will 
deter poorly because it will target the wrong firms for damage liability that 
will often be too small. The analysis offered here suggests that we ought to 
be able to identify cases where economic consequences of false disclosure 
are large and attempt to deter them through ex ante measures, such as 
 
 
 47. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1907.  
 48. See id. at 1918–23. 
 49. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 685 (1984) (observing that information provided by one firm will be 
useful to that firm’s rivals). Financial disclosure can also affect cartel duration. See Goncharov & 
Peter, supra note 46, at 4. 
 50. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1895.  
 51.  In fact, only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to bring a securities fraud 
cause of action. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 52. Several prominent commentators have suggested that securities litigation over-deters at the 
firm level (i.e., liability exposure for the firm is considerably larger than either the losses to 
shareholders’ portfolios or the benefit to the firm from false disclosure). See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, 
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 373, 378 (2005) (suggesting that “many scholars” argue that class actions overdeter); Paul G. 
Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 625–
26 (1992). But if fraud also causes economic harm to third parties, and that harm correlated with 
plaintiffs’ losses, then perhaps class actions deter firms about right. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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prophylactic regulation, and ex post measures, such as increased private 
liability and public enforcement. Ultimately, this Part provides evidence 
that should encourage courts handling securities class actions and agencies 
pursuing enforcement actions to recognize that securities litigation can 
valuably deter disclosure fraud, and—when in doubt—to err on the side of 
more litigation and enforcement of disclosure fraud. 
This Part first discusses how false disclosure distorts financial and 
economic decisions in various markets, not just the secondary market for 
publicly-traded securities. It then suggests that real economic distortion 
caused by false information will only sometimes correlate with stock-price 
distortion. Finally, this Part identifies a non-exhaustive list of determinants 
for when large real-economic distortion is likely. 
A. The Mechanics of Distortion  
Stock price distortion is the consequence, not the cause, of underlying 
fraudulent disclosure. Usually, managers release false information to 
disguise disappointing performance. Sometimes, it is to avoid bankruptcy. 
But more often, the firm misses an earnings target and is concerned about 
losing its high valuation.
53
 Concealing bad news, or news that is less than 
great, buys the manager time.
54
 
To mask the original lie, the manager must continue to lie, in venues 
that target the firm’s shareholders and in venues that do not.55 To the 
extent that the firm’s real actions are observable, the manager must 
conform his actions to the firm’s reported financial health in order to avoid 
detection of the misrepresentation.
56
 He might announce new projects, 
overinvest and overhire, even sell output at a loss.
57
 The firm might go on 
an acquisition binge, buying up other firms with overpriced stock. By 
misreporting the firm’s financial results and prospects, the manager 
credibly communicates to markets that the firm is more profitable and, 
 
 
 53. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements, 28 CONTEMP. 
ACCT. RES. 17, 21 (2011). 
 54. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 26, at 702–03. 
 55. A particularly memorable example of this phenomenon is Enron CEO Kenneth Lay’s 
meeting with thousands of Enron employees on August 16, 2001, two days after Jeffrey Skilling 
stepped down as CEO and two months before Enron restated its financial statements for 1997–2000. 
During the address, Lay reassured employees that all was well with the firm. gabel305, Enron 
Employee Meeting Part 1, YOUTUBE (Mar. 20, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6svTm 
7zC50w. 
 56. See Sadka, supra note 46, at 447 (observing that managers will change their business 
decisions to conceal fraud). 
 57. See id. at 439, 457–58. 
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importantly, less risky than it in fact is. Relying on false information, 
lenders underprice credit, and employees make career and retirement 
decisions based on a false picture of their firm’s prosperity.58 Conversely, 
because capital and labor are scarce and fraud firms hog a disproportionate 
share of each, honest firms cannot obtain the funds or the workers to 
pursue valuable projects.
59
 
Fraudulent disclosure also interferes with other firms’ ability to 
understand the markets in which they operate.
60
 Firms’ managers do not 
know ex ante what business strategy is optimal and so they often look to 
their rivals as gauges of what the market wants. Significant misreporting 
impairs rivals’ ability to discern the value of new investments and 
exacerbates investment booms and busts.
61
 
And, finally, false disclosure usually distorts the stock price.
62
 
Importantly, under Dura,
63
 stock price distortion by itself does not harm 
investors unless and until the truth comes out. By contrast, false disclosure 
can distort economic decisions by non-shareholders that rely on it from the 
outset and regardless of whether it is ever discovered. This is so because 
non-shareholders use the information itself to make investment decisions, 
rather than indirectly, as information is incorporated in the price of 
securities.  
B. Distortion and Litigation 
The extent to which false disclosure distorts the stock price depends on 
a variety of factors.
64
 Simple, credible, and saliently-disclosed information 
relating to a firm whose shares are traded frequently will be impounded 
into the stock price more quickly than information that is complicated, 
buried, or unusual, or relates to a more thinly traded security.
65
 The 
quicker and the more fully information is acquired, processed, and 
 
 
 58. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1923–26. 
 59. See id. at 1904. 
 60. See id. at 1929–30. 
 61. See, e.g., Paul Povel et al., Booms, Busts, and Fraud, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1219, 1222 (2007) 
(showing that fraud can prolong and exacerbate investment booms, leading to more painful busts). 
 62. “[W]hen fraud distorts securities prices, it produces a market-based harm. In the presence of 
a price distortion, all investors trade at the wrong price.” Fisch, supra note 12, at 913; see also 
generally Kahan, supra note 18 (discussing various social costs of distorted stock prices). 
 63. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). 
 64. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549, 611 (1984) (elaborating on the various parameters relevant to how fast and to what extent 
price responds to information). 
 65. See id. at 593–95.  
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verified, the faster the stock market reaction, assuming all else is equal.
66
 
As a result, different information regarding the same firm will be 
impounded into its stock price at different speeds and to a different extent, 
and the same information about different firms will be impounded into 
their respective stock prices at different speeds and to a different extent.
67
 
By contrast, real economic distortion depends on factors other than 
those affecting stock prices. Shareholder-plaintiffs in a fraud-on-the-
market class action are presumed to rely on the stock price, not on the 
underlying information.
68
 Non-shareholders, on the other hand, rely 
primarily on the information itself and only secondarily on the stock price, 
if at all.
69
 The extent to which the false information will distort their 
economic decisions will depend on different factors, including how 
important the information is for core investment decisions, whether there 
are other sources of information, and the credibility of the information. 
Over the last decade, several economic models and empirical studies 
have tried to identify the determinants of the economic impact of 
fraudulent disclosure on non-shareholders, in particular on creditors, 
vendors, and rivals.
70
 These studies suggest that in some cases, false 
financial disclosure will have little impact on non-shareholder behavior. 
Creditors, for example, are concerned about solvency and cash flows, and 
 
 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 n.6 (2013). Many 
others have noted the possibility of variable impact of different pieces of information on the stock 
price of a single firm. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 10, at 682–84 (discussion various 
determinants of stock price reactions to new information); James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in 
Private Securities Lawsuits: Building on Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1732 (2013) (explaining 
that “not all public information will be impounded in a security’s price with the same alacrity”). 
 68. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the 
price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly 
available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material 
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b–5 action.”). 
 69. Perhaps self-servingly, AT&T’s CEO later claimed that he made inefficient business 
decisions trying to compete with WorldCom’s reported, and fraudulent, numbers. See Rebecca 
Blumenstein & Peter Grant, Former Chief Tries to Redeem the Calls He Made at AT&T, WALL ST. J. 
(May 26, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108552358884921144. I do not want to 
overstate my claim. Non-shareholders do sometimes rely on the stock prices themselves. See, e.g., 
Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Sheridan Titman, Financial Market Shocks and the Macroeconomy 34 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19383, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2195184 (suggesting that stock prices themselves convey information about the value of 
investments, which in turn leads private firms to copy those investments). 
 70. See, e.g., Eitan Goldman et al., Financial Misrepresentations and Its Impact on Rivals, 41 
FIN. MGMT. 915, 931, 932 fig.3 (2012); Kedia et al., supra note 37, at 2337–40 (suggesting that rivals 
may copy fraudulent behaviors). 
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so are unlikely to care about marginal increases in profitability.
71
 In other 
cases, however, false disclosure will have a profound impact on non-
shareholder behavior. False disclosures that suggest high demand for a 
particular product can draw rival firms into the fraud firm’s markets, and 
can convince investors to pour capital into the industry and the firms in the 
industry to increase hiring. This leads to overcapacity that was never 
justified, and thereby paves the way to the inevitable, and painful, bust.
72
 
The fraud-on-the-market suit is available only in cases where the stock 
price distortion is relatively large (i.e., statistically significant, as 
demonstrated by an event study, ideally conducted at the time of the false 
disclosure). A complicating factor in fraudulent securities disclosure is the 
fact that many fraudulent disclosure cases are concealments:
73
 the firm 
continues to disclose that everything is going well, when things have in 
fact deteriorated. In such cases, fraudulent disclosure prevents a stock-
price drop that would have happened if truth had been told, and so the 
stock price does not move.
74
 Instead, litigants avoid this problem by 
looking at stock-price reaction at the time of the corrective disclosure.
75
 
This is problematic because “there is no systematic relationship between 
ex ante and ex post price distortion.”76 
But even if price impact at the time of the fraudulent disclosure and 
price distortion at the time of the corrective disclosure were identical, 
stock price distortions do not necessarily correlate with real economic 
distortions caused by the misrepresentation. The following table shows the 
possible pairings of distortions in the stock price and in the real economy 
caused by the same fraudulent disclosure. Stock price distortion is 
designated as significant if an event study can show significance with 95% 
confidence (as is usual in practice); otherwise, it is shown as insignificant.   
 
 
 71. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under 
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1541 (1982) (“The fixed return of the debt claim is designed to appeal 
to an investor whose aversion to risk is higher than that of a residual claimant in the same firm or to an 
investor who does not want to be concerned with the profit-maximization decisions of the firm.”).  
 72. Recent examples are the internet and telecommunication booms. An older example includes 
railroads: firms in the railroad industry laid extensive miles of track, including spurs to future towns 
that had not yet been built, only to be followed by numerous bankruptcies in the late 1870s. See 
generally Ľuboš Pástor & Pietro Veronesi, Technological Revolutions and Stock Prices, 99 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1451 (2009) (showing that stock prices of innovative firms exhibit bubbles during technological 
revolutions). 
 73. See Frank Torchio, Proper Event Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 159, 
165 (2009).  
 74. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 10, at 692; Fisch, supra note 12, at 921. 
 75. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 10, at 692–93.  
 76. Fisch, supra note 12, at 922.  
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TABLE 1: DISTORTION AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FRAUD-ON-THE-
MARKET (“FOTM”) SUITS 
 
 Insignificant Stock 
Price Distortion 
Significant Stock 
Price Distortion 
No or Small 
Economic Distortion  
No FOTM FOTM available 
Large Economic 
Distortion 
No FOTM FOTM available 
 
In the first quadrant (top left), false disclosure produces a statistically 
insignificant stock price distortion, and the real economic distortion, too, is 
small. This is usually because the misrepresentation itself is one that 
neither investors nor other market participants consider important. In such 
cases, no class action is nor should be available.
77
 
In the second quadrant (top right), false disclosure significantly distorts 
the stock price, but does not otherwise distort economic decision-making. 
For example, a profitable firm that operates in a fragmented (i.e., 
competitive) industry, where rivals do not pay attention to each firm’s 
disclosures, overstates its earnings during normal times. No rival firm 
copies its behavior, the fraud firm does not raise additional capital or 
increase employment, and the revelation does not push the firm over the 
edge. The firm has no ability to shift the cost of fraud away from 
shareholders, and any employees or vendors that are terminated in the 
aftermath of fraud quickly find substitute work. When that is the case, 
shareholders really are the residual risk-bearers and might be the only 
class of victims that false disclosure plausibly harms. A fraud-on-the-
market suit should be available
78
 and shareholder-plaintiffs would 
appropriately recover.
79
 
 
 
 77. The SEC could prosecute the violation anyway, either because it signals larger problems at 
the firm (i.e., a near-miss fraud), or because the SEC wants to send a message to other market 
participants. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2014) (authorizing the SEC to investigate violations of 
securities laws); see also generally Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and 
Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison 13, 29 tbl.2 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & 
Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-022, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109739 
(showing that firms facing only SEC enforcement report smaller, though still statistically significant, 
declines in the stock price on the date of the corrective disclosure). 
 78. Assuming that a court does not dismiss a meritorious suit—and some empirical work 
suggests that has happened. See, e.g., Quinn Curtis & Minor Myers, Do the Merits Matter? Empirical 
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In the third and fourth quadrants, available private remedies are 
inadequate. The mismatch between the fraud-on-the-market suit and 
deterrence is apparent in the third quadrant (bottom left), where the fraud-
on-the-market class action is unavailable despite a large real economic 
distortion caused by the fraud. This will usually happen because of a 
methodological or legal error. For example, stock-price distortion 
sometimes cannot be shown using the accepted methodology, either 
because the methodology misfires,
80
 or because the corrective disclosure is 
buried,
81
 leaks into the market slowly, or is bundled with other news about 
the issuer, good or bad.
82
 Such errors will not be distributed normally. 
Rather, false negatives are considerably more common than false 
positives; in other words, an event study will more often fail to show 
significance where it exists than the opposite, namely that an event study 
will show significance in the absence of a real event.
83
 It is unlikely, 
 
 
Evidence on Shareholder Suits from Options Backdating Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 334–37 
(2016) (showing that courts may have inefficiently dismissed meritorious backdating cases). 
 79. Subject to the above caveats about circularity, of course. See discussion supra Part II. 
 80. To show price impact, the plaintiff usually must procure an event study showing that the 
observed price change on the day of the corrective disclosure is: 
sufficiently negative that the change is greater than the market-adjusted changes on 95% of 
the other trading days over the preceding year. This permits the expert to reject with 95% 
confidence the proposition that the observed change on the day of the corrective disclosure 
was solely due to this day’s other bits of news and thus not due in any part to the disclosure. 
Fox, supra note 9 (emphasis omitted). Gelbach, Helland, and Klick have shown that single-firm, 
single-event studies commonly used in securities litigation have a consistent anti-plaintiff bias. Event-
study methodology will incorrectly reject as insignificant events that are, in fact, economically 
significant. See Jonah B. Gelbach et al., Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 495, 512–13 (2013); see also generally Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in 
Securities Litigation: Low Power, Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583 (2015). 
 In another forthcoming article, Edward Fox, Merritt Fox, and Ron Gilson have shown that 
volatility of individual firm stock prices increases markedly during financial crises. As a result, even 
large stock-price movements will not be statistically significant. See Edward G. Fox et al., Economic 
Crisis and the Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 9-10), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401712. 
 Relatedly, several studies suggest that idiosyncratic risk tends to decrease relative to systematic 
risk after industry booms. As a result, fewer firm-specific disclosures will be identified as statistically 
significant ex post, even if they in fact significantly distorted the stock price ex ante. See, e.g., Gerard 
Hoberg & Gordon Phillips, Real and Financial Industry Booms and Busts, 65 J. FIN. 45, 78 tbl.VIII 
(2010) (showing a significant decline in idiosyncratic risk for most types of firms); Pástor & Veronesi, 
supra note 72, at 1477 (providing evidence that during bubbles, such as the internet bubble in the 
1990s, stock prices rise because of idiosyncratic factors, but then move largely in step). 
 81. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 82. See, e.g., James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. 653, 674–75 (2007) (explaining how Dura gives firms an incentive to 
bundle other news with disclosure of fraud). 
 83. See Fox et al., supra note 80 (manuscript at 39–42) (showing that the outcome is particularly 
likely when stock prices are unusually volatile; that is, during financial crises). 
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though not entirely impossible, that a truly insignificant stock price 
distortion produces a large real economic distortion.
84
 
Less apparent, but still likely to produce under-deterrence, is the result 
shown in the fourth quadrant (bottom right): a significant stock-price 
distortion that is accompanied by a large economic distortion. In such 
cases, a fraud-on-the-market class action is usually available. But even a 
large settlement can under-deter false disclosure that produces large real 
economic consequences because the amount of damages depends solely on 
the difference between the price that purchasers paid for the securities and 
the value absent the misrepresentation. The longer the class period, and the 
more frequently the stock is traded, the higher the potential “out-of-
pocket” damages. But the amount of trading losses has nothing to do with 
the size of the overall economic impact—which can be considerably larger 
than trading losses. For example, the WorldCom securities class action 
settlement fund at $6.1 billion is the second largest on record; $5 billion of 
that went to bondholders.
85
 Yet the WorldCom fraud had “sizable spillover 
effects.”86 WorldCom’s rivals, alone, lost $7.8 billion to its accounting 
fraud;
87
 and this figure does not include losses to employees, vendors, 
communities, and the government.
88
 To the extent that enforcement 
surrounding the WorldCom fraud had a deterrent effect, criminal actions 
packed a much greater punch than the class action settlement. 
 
 
 84. A firm that operates in a concentrated industry usually has considerable pricing power and 
can pass on the cost of business shocks to customers through price increases. If its product is 
sufficiently specialized, the firm can reduce its vendor and labor cost through contract renegotiation or 
termination. See, e.g., Hoberg & Phillips, supra note 80, at 48; José-Miguel Gaspar & Massimo Massa, 
Idiosyncratic Volatility and Product Market Competition, 79 J. BUS. 3125, 3126 (2006) (“A firm with 
monopoly power is able to pass on a bigger proportion of any idiosyncratic cost shocks to its 
consumers.”). There could be no significant stock-price reaction to the corrective disclosure. Where 
there is no statistically significant stock-price reaction to the false disclosure (or its correction in the 
case of a confirmatory lie), courts have dismissed fraud-on-the-market actions for lack of materiality 
or lack of loss causation, regardless of whether the false disclosure produced a large real economic 
distortion. See, e.g., Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 655, 660–61 (4th Cir. 2004); 
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 
1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997); Cox, supra note 67, at 1734–36; cf. No. 84 Emp’r-Teamster Joint Council 
Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the district 
court’s decision to dismiss the complaint). 
 85. Gretchen Morgenson, Bank to Pay $2 Billion to Settle WorldCom Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/17/business/bank-to-pay-2-billion-to-settle-worldcom-
claims.html. 
 86. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the 
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1066 (2009). 
 87. J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of 
American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE  J. ON REG. 207, 235 (2003). 
 88. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1891–92, 1944. 
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As shown in this section, in some cases false disclosure will cause 
major economic harm, in others not. Empirical studies show considerable 
variation in stock price reactions to disclosure of financial manipulation.
89
 
Sometimes significant stock price distortions will be accompanied by 
modest or small real economic distortions; at other times, they will be 
accompanied by large economic losses. Where the economic distortion 
other than a rearrangement of wealth among shareholders is small, 
exclusive focus on purchasers and sellers of securities in securities 
litigation is consistent with deterrence. Where the economic distortion is 
large, issuer’s damage liability might be too small—not too large as is 
commonly the concern
90—and securities litigation will under-deter. 
Significantly, legal and methodological mechanisms designed to eliminate 
excessive securities litigation have the undesirable side effect of weeding 
out class actions where real economic losses are considerable, yet an event 
study cannot consistently show a statistically significant price impact.
91
 In 
such cases, a fraud-on-the-market suit will be promptly dismissed (or, 
more likely, never filed).
92
 This is not new to Halliburton II, but suggests 
that securities litigation can significantly under-deter disclosure fraud. 
C. Determinants of Economic Distortion 
Stock price data is readily available and the impact of information on 
stock prices has been extensively studied. Information about other 
economic activities is neither as readily available nor as easy to interpret 
as stock price data. As a result, the economic consequences of disclosure 
 
 
 89. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 591 tbl.5 (2008) (showing considerable variation in cumulative 
abnormal returns around the date of the corrective disclosure). 
 90. See, e.g., Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 40, at 155 (raising concern about “the 
possibility that issuer damage liability may be disproportionate to the underlying conduct”). 
 91. Legal mechanisms include the PSLRA and Supreme Court decisions, in particular, Dura, 
Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011) (holding that individuals or firms 
that do not issue or sign do not “make” statements giving rise to liability, even if they drafted the 
statements), and Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) 
(limiting liability to secondary actors who visibly participate in the scheme, rather than doing so 
behind the scenes). 
 92. See, e.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 29 tbl.2 (showing that class actions are filed in 
cases with a large and significant decline in the stock price around the day of the corrective 
disclosure). 
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and fraudulent disclosure “are still largely unexplored.”93 But recent work 
suggests that economic distortions beget by fraud can be considerable.
94
 
Generally speaking, persistent frauds produce greater economic 
distortions than those of shorter duration.
95
 While the firm is concealing 
the truth, its economic situation can deteriorate beyond repair. Longer-
lasting frauds are more likely to crowd out efficient investments and 
encourage rivals to enter or exit the industry.
96
 Frauds affecting larger 
firms, too, tend to produce more severe economic consequences.
97
 Large 
firms use more human and financial capital. Their frauds will tend to 
produce a larger economic displacement in the aggregate, in particular 
where the large firm is an industry leader with considerable market 
power.
98
 The type of the misrepresentation also matters.
99
 Rivals, vendors, 
and large customers are more likely to use and to rely on a misstatement of 
core accounts, such as revenues, sales, market share, and cost of goods 
sold, than on the firm’s pension fund returns.  
All three determinants—duration of fraud, the size of the fraud firm, 
and the type of fraudulent disclosure—will tend to correlate with out-of-
pocket damages in a fraud-on-the-market class action. The longer the class 
period, the more trades have taken place. Market capitalization of the firm 
is an important factor in the potential size of the settlement pool. And 
fraud regarding core accounts will be highly relevant for predicting future 
performance, and hence affect the stock price. The fraud-on-the-market 
class action could still be dismissed, either because the defendant bundled 
the corrective disclosure with other news, good or bad, and thus made it 
very difficult to show price distortion, or because the event study 
 
 
 93. Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and 
Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research 12 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished 
working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398. 
 94. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1929–37. 
 95. See James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 513, 
550 (2009) (using fundamental analysis to argue that persistent misstatements should be presumptively 
material); Abigail Brown & Simon D. Angus, Destroying Creative Destruction: The Social Welfare 
Cost of Fraud 28 (Oct. 13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://abigailbrown. 
files.wordpress.com/2009/08/non-anon1.pdf (observing that persistent fraud is far more damaging than 
intermittent fraud). 
 96. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1941.  
 97. See id. at 1942.  
 98. See Gleason et al., supra note 46, at 103–04 (finding that competitors’ stock prices decline 
significantly when the restating firm is large but show no effect when the restating firm is small); 
Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation 
After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 374–75 (2013) (suggesting that WorldCom and Enron were 
different from run-of-the-mill accounting frauds because of their size). 
 99. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1941. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/11
  
 
 
 
 
2015] DISTORTION OTHER THAN PRICE DISTORTION 443 
 
 
 
 
generated a false negative. But if available, fraud duration, firm size, and 
the substance of false disclosure will tend to increase both the economic 
harm and out-of-pocket shareholder losses.  
A less well understood but important cross-cutting determinant of the 
economic cost of fraudulent disclosure is competition.
100
 Product market 
competition has several interesting effects on the relationship between 
financial disclosure fraud and its economic consequences—under some 
circumstances pushing economic distortion and stock-price distortion in 
opposite directions. The conventional wisdom among economists is that 
product market competition reduces managerial slack and thus agency 
costs.
101
 And so one would expect less fraud in more competitive markets 
and more in concentrated markets. But in reality, the constraint imposed 
by product market competition varies, depending on the business cycle, on 
transparency in reporting, and on other factors.
102
 
Firms coordinate their actions with industry peers, which affects 
product market competition, and vice versa. Mandatory disclosure of 
relevant product market information, such as revenues, sales, and cost-per-
unit sold, is costly for each firm to produce, but generates a positive 
externality for all firms in the industry and the economy as a whole in that 
it facilitates coordination.
103
 Conversely, false disclosure interferes with 
this process.
104
 Recent work suggests that the characteristics of the 
markets in which the firm operates and the relative power of the firm in 
such markets affect its and its rivals’ investment decisions.105 
Competitive, or fragmented, industries are more prone to boom-and-
bust cycles than are concentrated industries. Fragmented industries also 
tend to fare worse after a fraud wave than concentrated industries.
106
 
 
 
 100. See id. at 1942–44. 
 101. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Takeover Defenses and Competition: The Role of 
Stakeholders, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 791, 812–13 (2008) (showing that protections from hostile 
takeovers reduce market value of firms in concentrated industries, but not of those in competitive 
industries, suggesting that product market competition disciplines management); Karthik Balakrishnan 
& Daniel A. Cohen, Competition and Financial Accounting Misreporting 4 (Sept. 30, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1927427 (showing that product market 
competition can discipline misreporting). 
 102. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1943–44.  
 103. See Goncharov & Peter, supra note 46, at abstract (“Firms coordinate their actions with 
industry peers, which affects product market competition.”). The authors also report that increased 
accounting transparency reduces the number of cartels and their duration. See id. at 29. 
 104. See Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 93, at 13. 
 105. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1942–44. 
 106. See Hoberg & Phillips, supra note 80, at 46; Tracy Yue Wang & Andrew Winton, Product 
Market Interactions and Corporate Fraud 25–26 (Feb. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2398035.  
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During periods of rapid growth, the constraint that the competitive product 
market ordinarily imposes on managers to commit fraud disappears. As 
investors chase firms with good projects, bad firms in the industry have an 
incentive to lie. During a bull market, investors compete for investment 
opportunities and in their rush reduce monitoring.
107
 As the fever pitch 
increases, fraud, too, tends to increase.
108
 In addition to misallocating 
capital, fraud also biases the common signal on which firms in the industry 
and outside investors rely—the signal being that the product market is hot 
and more resources should pour into it. In particular in fragmented 
industries, where managers generally have little information outside of the 
common signal, they are likely to make similar investment decisions—all 
distorted by fraud.
109
 Boom cycles rarely affect all industries at once. 
Fraud in one segment leads to overhiring, overinvestment, and 
overcapacity in that segment
110
 and starves another segment of needed 
capital and labor, producing deadweight losses in the process.
111
 The 
effect is more pronounced in industries where the barriers to entry are 
low.
112
 
Fraud in fragmented industries is pro-cyclical: it prolongs and 
amplifies the boom and bust cycles.
113
 Firms rush to invest and expand 
based on the fraudulent signal, making the future collapse all the more 
painful.
114
 Wang and Winton also provide evidence that firms that commit 
fraud during industry booms experience a larger decrease in profitability 
than those that commit fraud during normal times.
115
 
 
 
 107. Povel et al., supra note 61, at 1220. 
 108. See id. at 1243–44.  
 109. See Hoberg & Phillips, supra note 80, at 49. Wang and Winton explain that collecting 
information about individual firms in a fragmented industry is costly, which is why managers and 
investors rely on the common signal, an aggregate of disclosures by all firms in the industry. Wang & 
Winton, supra note 106, at 11. 
 110. Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2169, 2193, 2194 fig.3 (2009).  
 111. See Art Durnev & Claudine Mangen, Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements, 
47 J. ACCT. RES. 679, 697 (2009) (finding that competitors on average reduce investments by 5.6% in 
the year of the restatement, by 5.2% the following year, by 2.6% the year thereafter, and by 16.2% in 
the third year after the restatement). 
 112. See Balakrishnan & Cohen, supra note 101, at 5 (explaining that the disciplining effect of 
competition is more pronounced in industries where financial statements are more comparable); Phillip 
G. Berger & Rebecca Hann, Segment Disclosures, Proprietary Costs, and the Market for Corporate 
Control 8 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=357780.  
 113. See Wang & Winton, supra note 106, at 4.  
 114. See id. at 29. 
 115. See id. at 27–28 (finding a 4% decrease in profitability of fraud firms during normal times 
and a 6.3% decrease for firms that commit fraud during industry booms). 
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Ironically, event study methodology is particularly vulnerable to errors 
during crisis and bust times, and biases downward the number of 
statistically significant results.
116
 And so, one would expect that at least 
some number of disclosure frauds will produce the result shown in the 
third quadrant in Table 1: no fraud-on-the-market class action, despite a 
large economic distortion aggregated across multiple firms. 
Concentrated industries are less susceptible to fraud waves during 
boom cycles but their odds of committing fraud are higher during normal 
times compared with firms in fragmented industries.
117
 Fraudulent 
disclosure distorts concentrated industries differently, though no less 
significantly. Because there are fewer firms in the industry, information 
about the demand for each firm’s product—sales, earnings, profit 
margins—has a meaningful impact on rivals’ capacity decisions. As a 
result, firms in oligopolistic industries have more to lose from disclosing 
such information to rivals.
118
 One would expect disclosures by firms in 
concentrated industries to be less transparent, but disclosures that are 
released would be highly relevant and important in rivals’ business 
decisions. When disclosure about demand for one firm’s product has a 
meaningful impact on its rivals’ decisions, we can assume that rivals are 
collecting information about that firm.
119
 Closer monitoring of individual 
firm disclosures generally reduces the prevalence of fraud in concentrated 
industries.
120
 However, if a manager issues a credible, but false, statement, 
even a single-firm misrepresentation can distort rival behavior in 
concentrated markets, affecting hiring, investment, and output.
121
 
 
 
 116. See Fox et al., supra note 80 (manuscript at 9-10); Hoberg & Phillips, supra note 80, at 78 
tbl.VIII (showing that idiosyncratic risk tends to decrease relative to systematic risk after industry 
booms). As a result, fewer firm-specific disclosures will be identified as statistically significant ex 
post, even if they in fact significantly distorted the stock price ex ante. See id. 
 117. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1922, 1940 (citing Tracy Yue Wang & Andrew Winton, 
Competition and Corporate Fraud Waves 26 (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783752). 
 118.  See Wang & Winton, supra note 106, at 7. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Nanette Byrnes, P.J. Huffstutter & Mihir Dalal, Insight: Seeds of Trouble Sown at 
Diamond Foods Years Ago, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2012, 1:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
diamond-tax-idUSBRE82I0AQ20120319 (reporting that a consultant working for a rival company 
noticed irregular accounting at Diamond Foods); see also generally Frank Gigler, Self-Enforcing 
Voluntary Disclosures, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 224, 225 (1994) (modeling that firms cannot communicate 
different information to capital markets and competitors, which increases the credibility of their 
disclosures). But not all industries work like this. In certain industries, misreported information deters 
rival entry. In such industries, fraud is more likely because it benefits the firm in both capital and 
product markets. See, e.g., Wang & Winton, supra note 106, at 20–21. 
 121. See Balakrishnan & Cohen, supra note 101, at 9.  
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Importantly, product market power can sever the relationship between 
fraudulent disclosure and stock-price distortion, and so a large 
misrepresentation does not necessarily lead to a large stock-price 
distortion.
122
 The conventional wisdom holds that investors as residual 
owners bear the cost of disclosure fraud. But this conclusion holds only for 
firms in truly competitive industries and in truly competitive, informed, 
and frictionless markets for labor, capital, and products. In all other cases 
firms are able to shield their profits and their stock prices and pass along 
some of the cost of business shocks from the more competitive financial 
markets to the relatively less competitive real markets for labor and 
product markets.
123
 As a result, firms with market power have lower stock-
price volatility than those operating in fragmented industries,
124
 while their 
product prices fluctuate.
125
 There is also evidence that firms in 
concentrated markets shift some of the post-disclosure cost of fraud to 
employees.
126
 As a result, the stock-price reaction to corrective disclosure 
by a firm with market power will be reduced by whatever cost the fraud 
firm can externalize. 
IV. POLICING FRAUDULENT DISCLOSURE 
This Article, thus, offers several conclusions related to Halliburton II 
and the broader goal of policing fraudulent disclosure. First, Halliburton II 
allows defendants to offer evidence that the alleged fraudulent disclosure 
did not distort the stock price.
127
 While defendants certainly had the right 
to do the same pre-Halliburton II at the motion to dismiss and at the 
summary judgment stages,
128
 the standard of review for class certification 
is more favorable to defendants. It is, thus, likely that Halliburton II will, 
on the margin, prevent class certification at least in some cases that would 
othervise survive the motions to dismiss and summary judgment, and end 
 
 
 122. See generally Peress, supra note 22, at 5 (explaining that product market power enables firms 
to shield profits from shocks by passing them on to their consumers). 
 123. Cf. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 34 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) 
(observing that firms can transfer rents from employees to shareholders). 
 124. See, e.g., Gaspar & Massa, supra note 84, at 3148.  
 125. See, e.g., Gasparro, supra note 22 (reporting that the firm’s customers were less sensitive to 
price increases than its rivals and so the firm decided to raise prices of brewed coffee to offset higher 
costs caused by futures contracts for coffee that the firm purchased).  
 126. See, e.g., Kedia & Philippon, supra note 110, at 2195, 2197. 
 127. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014). 
 128. See id. at 2413 (observing that “all agree defendants may” “rebut the presumption of reliance 
with evidence of a lack of price impact”). 
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litigation right there and then. And it is also likely, based on the foregoing, 
that at least in some of these cases, the real economic distortion that false 
disclosure produced is sufficiently large that such frauds should be 
deterred. At this most obvious level, Halliburton II is bad news for 
securities litigation as well as for the quality of corporate disclosures.  
Second, at a somewhat higher level of generality, the discussion in this 
Article suggests that Halliburton II is the wrong solution for the wrong 
problem. The solution offered in Halliburton II is “wrong” because it 
prevents cases from going forward at a time when it is not obvious that too 
many securities class actions are being filed. In 2014, securities class 
action settlements saw a sixteen-year low.
129
 Because the screen used to 
filter out unmeritorious cases is imperfect, it seems plausible that the 
benefit of Halliburton II (i.e., preventing class certification of meritless 
cases) will exceed the cost (i.e., dismissal or deterrence of meritorious 
cases). 
It is worth noting that mandatory disclosure (and disclosure more 
generally) performs an important economic function, and does not exist 
simply to ensure that publicly-traded securities change hands at the right 
price. Mandatory disclosure was never just about securities trading at 
accurate prices,
130
 despite what Halliburton II would have us believe.
131
 
And so it is unfortunate that private policing of issuer disclosures has been 
limited to purchasers and sellers in the market for public securities.  
It is also unfortunate that Rule 10b-5 has become the primary legal 
authority to police companies’ disclosures. First, and foremost, the fraud-
on-the-market suit is a remedy limited to securities traders. As explained 
in more detail in Part II, at least on average, securities traders are not 
harmed by false disclosure.
132
 But that observation does not imply that 
securities traders are never harmed by false disclosure, nor does it imply 
that false disclosure does not engender economic losses beyond trading 
losses. They are and it does. Yet, only purchasers and sellers of securities 
have the right to sue.
133
 Rivals, vendors, creditors, and employees 
generally do not have standing to sue for disclosure fraud, despite actual 
detrimental reliance on false disclosure.
134
 Because they lack standing, it is 
 
 
 129. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2014 REVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS 1 (2015), available at https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/701f936e-ab1d-425b-
8304-8a3e063abae8/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2014-Review-and-Analysis.pdf. 
 130. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2014). 
 131. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409–11. 
 132. See supra Part II.  
 133. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747 (1975). 
 134. See Velikonja, supra note 15, at 1925–26.  
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very easy to forget in the academic discussion and legal analysis of 
securities litigation that disclosure fraud produces victims other than 
purchasers and sellers of securities. The reason that limiting our 
conceptual analysis is problematic is that securities holders, as a class, are 
not harmed by false disclosure (at least at the portfolio level), whereas 
non-shareholders are, in fact, harmed, and cannot reduce or diversify away 
their losses. Once one has reached the conclusion that securities holders—
the victims of disclosure fraud—are not harmed by it (at least ex ante), it is 
easy then to argue to curtail and limit the class action to an ever-narrower 
set of facts that trigger litigation and liability.  
Second, damages in a fraud-on-the-market suit are calculated based on 
the purchasers’ and sellers’ net out-of-pocket losses.135 The potential 
damages will generally be much larger than those purchasers’ and sellers’ 
portfolio losses from fraud,
136
 suggesting that fraud-on-the-market suits 
overcompensate securities traders. But since damages come from the same 
securities traders’ pockets, fraud-on-the-market suits are often portrayed as 
a mere wealth transfer, minus sizeable transaction costs in the form of 
attorneys’ fees.137 From that vantage point, it is a small step to conclude 
that fraud-on-the-market litigation should be curtailed, and perhaps 
eliminated, since it harms the very plaintiff-victims it is designed to 
compensate.
138
 
But as explained in Part III, this view cannot be reconciled with the 
economic reality that disclosure fraud produces real economic losses that 
fraud-on-the-market class actions cannot and do not compensate.
139
 The 
fact that those who did not trade in public company securities during the 
class period do not have standing to bring a Rule 10b-5 suit does not imply 
that non-traders have nothing to lose from disclosure fraud—whether these 
non-traders are holders of securities,
140
 creditors, employees, rivals, or the 
 
 
 135. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 
1322–23 (2008). 
 136. Most cases settle, and settlement amounts are usually a fraction of potential damages. 
 137. Cf. Lynn A. Baker et al., Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in Securities 
Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 (2015) (examining fee-setting in securities class actions filed 
between 2007 and 2012). 
 138. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Halliburton II: A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 27, 28 (2015) (comparing securities litigation to “kudzu”). 
 139. See supra Part III. The Article leave the question of available damages and eligible recipients 
for another day and another paper.   
 140.  The rationale in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Supreme Court decision that 
limited fraud-on-the-market litigation to purchasers and sellers, was not that those who held on to the 
stock during the period of misrepresentation were not harmed. 421 U.S. 723, 743 (1975). Rather, they 
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government. It is easy to conflate standing with injury. But just because 
someone does not have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 does not imply a 
lack of injury. One can have injury without standing—as this Article set 
out to show.  
In light of these economic realities, the securities class action is best 
understood not as a remedy to compensate losses suffered by defrauded 
purchasers and sellers of securities, but as a private mechanism to police 
disclosure fraud, a quasi qui tam cause of action.
141
 The requirement to 
show a significant stock price reaction to new information is an imperfect 
mechanism to ensure that fraud-on-the-market litigation is filed in cases 
that are economically significant. The requirement that purchasers and 
sellers of securities bring the class action is there to ensure that the parties 
have some stake in the dispute. If anything, perhaps we ought to relax the 
requirements of reliance and loss causation, neither of which make 
conceptual sense once the fraud-on-the-market class action is understood 
as a deterrence tool, not primarily about compensation. But so long as 
fraud-on-the-market litigation deters economically wasteful false 
disclosure, it is irrelevant that the average securities holder is not harmed 
by false disclosure, at least ex ante.
142
 That fraud-on-the-market litigation 
deters false disclosure is sufficient justification for the existence of the 
class action, regardless of whether purchasers require compensation and 
regardless of whether shareholders or the managers pay damages.
143
  
Thus repurposed, there is little evidence that fraud-on-the-market 
litigation ought to be curtailed. If anything, false disclosure is likely under-
policed.
144
 In addition, the SEC whistleblower program is a necessary 
 
 
are denied standing for policy reasons. Id. (“The Birnbaum rule undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who 
have in fact been damaged by violations of Rule 10b-5, and to that extent it is undesirable.”). 
 141. See Fisch, supra note 35, at 198–202 (comparing qui tam and class action litigation); see also 
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 59 (“All of this has long suggested that Congress should revisit the entire 
remedial approach in the fraud-on-the-market setting, enabling private litigation but making it more 
clearly a deterrence-based mechanism.”). 
 142. Professors Hillary Sale and Bob Thompson make a related argument in their paper published 
in this issue. See Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and 
Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 528–30 (2015). 
 143. Assuming, of course, that the social welfare cost-benefit of such litigation is positive.  
 144. Of course, private litigation is not the only deterrent for financial manipulation. The SEC and 
the DOJ, too, prosecute securities fraud. Available empirical work suggests less than perfect overlap 
between securities litigation and securities enforcement. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, 
SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 765–66, 776–77 (2003) 
(showing that the SEC targets smaller firms, frauds of longer duration, and firms in financial distress); 
see also Choi & Pritchard, supra note 77, at 20, 22–24 (reporting evidence of differential enforcement 
caused by Dura’s loss causation requirement and arguing that fraud-on-the-market class actions 
provide greater deterrence against more serious securities frauds than SEC enforcement). 
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complement, even if it remains small, at least for the time being.
145
 
Finally, prophylactic measures to ensure truthful disclosure are important. 
Although there is little more than anecdotal evidence for the 
recommendation, the much-maligned CEO and CFO certifications, and the 
sub-certifications they induce, are among the most effective regulatory 
reforms to improve disclosure quality. They provide a powerful incentive 
for managers to think twice about companies’ disclosures and increase the 
likelihood that such disclosures will be truthful. 
CONCLUSION 
An enforcement mechanism to police fraudulent disclosure by issuers 
that is predicated on stock price distortion will do two things.
146
 First, it 
will not deter those fraudulent disclosures where the stock price distortion, 
for whatever reason, is not statistically significant
147—and that may 
include frauds with considerable real economic harms. Second, it will 
under-deter fraudulent disclosures where the real economic distortion is 
large, regardless of the size of the stock price distortion. Neither effect is 
new to Halliburton II, but both suggest that there is now a real limitation 
on securities litigation as a mechanism to protect market integrity and 
resource allocation.
148
 This is caused by the mismatch between the 
plaintiff class and the universe of victims harmed by false disclosure. The 
mismatch reduces the quantity and the quality of securities litigation and 
undermines the class action as a supplement to public enforcement. And 
that is unfortunate. 
This Article proposes an alternative justification for fraud-on-the-
market litigation: as a quasi qui tam mechanism to police false disclosure. 
Broadening our understanding of who is harmed by false disclosure 
undermines the most salient argument against fraud-on-the-market 
litigation—namely, that such litigation harms shareholders, ostensible 
victims of false disclosure, at considerable cost. Rather, even if fraud-on-
 
 
 145. See Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program 
Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1273–75 (2014). 
 146. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 
(2014); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the 
price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.”). 
 147. In fact, a fraud-on-the-market lawsuit simply will not be filed. See Choi & Pritchard, supra 
note 77, at 29 tbl.2 (showing that class actions are filed in cases with a large and significant decline in 
the stock price around the day of the corrective disclosure). 
 148. In addition, of course, to the usual complaint that individual wrongdoers almost never pay 
out of pocket. 
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the-market litigation comes at a cost to shareholders, the welfare benefit 
may nevertheless outweigh that cost. When viewed through this lens, 
many of the objections to securities litigation become weaker and its 
virtues are revealed. 
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